370 S.E.2d 748 (1)


45274.Supreme Court of Georgia.
DECIDED JUNE 30, 1988.

BELL, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this case to consider the holding of our Court of Appeals that the applicants-condemnees could not avail themselves of the renewal provision of former OCGA § 9-2-61
(a), Ga. Laws 1967, pp. 226, 244, § 39.[1] Adams v. Cobb County, 184 Ga. App. 879 (363 S.E.2d 260) (1987). Having reviewed this issue, we conclude that the court of appeals’ decision is correct. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except, Smith and Weltner, JJ., who dissent.

[1] OCGA § 9-2-61 (a) formerly provided the law applicable to the renewal of actions dismissed because no written order had been entered in the actions for five years. Subsection (c) of OCGA § 9-2-60, as amended in 1984, Ga. L. 1984, pp. 597-599, now provides the law applicable to the renewal of such actions. OCGA § 9-2-61 (a) still provides the law applicable to the renewal of actions dismissed for other reasons.

WELTNER, Justice, dissenting.

For every practical purpose and for every substantive issue, a condemnee who appeals a determination of value to a jury under OCGA § 32-3-14 is a plaintiff.

The renewal statute, OCGA § 9-2-61 (a), is remedial in nature and should be construed broadly. Its provisions should extend to these appellants as de facto plaintiffs. See OCGA § 1-3-5 Bryan v. Bryan, 242 Ga. 826, 828-9 (251 S.E.2d 566) (1979).

I am authorized to state that Justice Smith joins in this dissent.

Page 353

DECIDED JUNE 30, 1988.
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 184 Ga. App. 879.

Crim Bassler, Harry W. Bassler, for appellants.

Awtry Parker, Dana L. Jackel, for appellee.