65 S.E.2d 629
33537.Court of Appeals of Georgia.
DECIDED JUNE 9, 1951.
1, 2. The court did not err in authorizing the jury to find that the defendant had violated the provision of the Safety Appliance Act in not having a car equipped with couplers which could be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.
3. There is no merit in the contention that the verdict for the full amount sued for is excessive for the reason that the evidence required a finding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. The evidence authorized the finding that the injuries were due in part to a violation of the Safety Appliance Act and in such cases there is no deduction for an employee’s negligence. 45 U.S.C.A. 54; Coray v. Sou. Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520 (69 Sup. Ct. 275, 93 L. ed. 208).
DECIDED JUNE 9, 1951.
Damages; from Tift Superior Court — Judge Lilly. February 10, 1951.
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H. A. Chapman sued the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received by him while in the employment of the defendant. The petition alleged, substantially: that plaintiff was a trainman on a local freight train and that his duties required that he couple and uncouple cars and ride cars and apply and release hand brakes in switching operations; that in order to get a car of scrap iron placed for a certain switching operation it was necessary for plaintiff to uncouple the car of scrap iron from another car on the right-hand side and that when he attempted to do so the lift lever would not lift the coupler lock and he was forced to go to the opposite side of the cars to uncouple the cars; that after he uncoupled the cars he stepped to the ground for the purpose of catching the rear end of the uncoupled car to mount the same and apply the hand brakes and when he did so he stepped on an angle bar lying between the main-line track and the passing track with his right foot, lost his balance and fell forward between the tracks; that he did not see the angle bar which was covered with grass and concealed from his view; that prior to the occurrence aforesaid, defendant had allowed lumps of coal, clinkers, rocks, scraps of metal and angle bars and other like debris to collect and remain in its yards and along the side of and between the tracks aforesaid, and that said condition had existed for a period of thirty days or longer period prior to petitioner’s injuries and that petitioner, in the performance of his duties aforesaid, had to pass over and upon said material and debris; that it was the duty of defendant to use reasonable and proper care to furnish petitioner with a safe place to work and perform his duties in the course of his employment; that the debris described, scattered along the sides of tracks in the defendant’s yards at said place, made such yards at such point unsafe for use by petitioner in the performance of his duties and the defendant thereby failed to furnish petitioner a safe place to work by reason thereof; that at all times herein mentioned defendant was a common carrier by railroad engaged in the transportation of interstate commerce, and the instrumentalities upon which petitioner was working at said time and place were instrumentalities that were used in the furtherance of interstate commerce and petitioner at the time of his injuries
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was engaged in interstate commerce; that the cut lever and look pin on the coupler of the car aforesaid were old and worn; that the links of the chain of the cut lever were so long that before the lock pin would be lifted sufficiently, the cut lever would hit the end of the car so that the same would not uncouple when petitioner endeavored to effect the uncoupling, by lifting the cut lever aforesaid, in the usual and customary manner; that the defendant was negligent in the following particulars, to wit: (a) In allowing lumps of coal, scrap iron, angle bars, scraps of metal and other debris to collect and remain in its yards and along the sides of its tracks at said point, well knowing that said yards and said tracks in such condition were dangerous and unsafe for use by trainmen working therein and thereabouts, and that petitioner would have to perform his duties thereabouts with such premises in said condition; (b) In not removing the debris aforesaid from its yards before assigning petitioner to work therein at said time and place, as herein alleged; (c) In failing the furnish petitioner with a reasonable safe place to work; (d) In having in its train a car with a coupler and cut lever which would not uncouple the car from the other cars at said time, which necessitated petitioner’s having to go to the opposite side of said cars to effect the switching movement; that the negligence of the defendant was the direct and proximate cause of petitioner’s injuries. The defendant answered, contending that the plaintiff’s injuries were due solely to his own negligence. The jury found for the plaintiff the full amount sued for. The defendant’s amended motion for a new trial was overruled and it excepted.
S. spencer Bennet, R. D. Smith, Thomas K. Vann Jr., for plaintiff in error.
T. J. Lewis, T. J. Lewis Jr., R. R. Forrester, contra.
FELTON, J.
Counsel for both sides state that this action was brought both under the Federal Employees Liability Act and the Safety Appliance Act and as the case was apparently so tried without objection by the defendant, it shall be so treated by this court.
Two excerpts from the court’s charge are excepted to. One was to the effect that in determining whether the defendant was negligent in respect of the defective coupling the jury could
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consider the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act, as follows: “Sec. 2. Automatic couplers. It shall be unlawful for any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.” The other excerpt stated that the effect of a failure to comply with the Safety Appliance Act could not be avoided by proof of care and diligence.
1. The first question to be determined is whether a violation of Section two of the Safety Appliance Act was proved. The defendant contends that it was not, for the reason that there was no proof that the couplers would not couple on impact not that it was necessary for one to go between the cars to uncouple the couplers inasmuch as plaintiff did not go between the cars but uncoupled the cars from the side of the train on the opposite side of the train. We think this question was settled by the case of Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. U.S., 205 Fed. Rep. 40 (Cir. Ct. of App. First Circuit). In that case the United States sued the railroad for penalty for hauling on its lines three cars not equipped as required by Section two of the Safety Appliance Act. The uncontradicted evidence showed that the coupler at one end of each of them was not in good working order. The court held that the act was violated as to each care despite the fact that the cars could have been uncoupled from the other side of the train by use of the efficient coupler on the adjoining car to reach which it would have been necessary to go over, under or around the train. The effect of this ruling is that each car is a unit and that if the lever by which the couplers are uncoupled is so defective as not to effect the uncoupling, as a matter of law the result is to require one’s going between the cars to effect the uncoupling notwithstanding the uncoupling could be done from the other side of the train by use of another lever on another car. On such authority we hold that there was evidence in this case that the act was violated and that the charges excepted to were not error for the first reason assigned.
2. The second contention of the defendant is that the defective coupler was not the efficient proximate cause of the injuries,
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and that the proximate cause was the negligence of the defendant in not keeping the track free of debris, etc. Under the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States this contention is without merit. Afforded v. N. Y., Chicago and St. Louis R. Co., 339, U.S. 96 (70 Sup. Ct. 509, 94 L. ed. 683), and citations. In that case it was held that defective couplers were the proximate cause of injuries to an employee who tried to stop a string of moving cars which had separated from others after an earlier failure of two of them to couple on impact. The rationale of that decision and others is that defective couplers are a contributing proximate cause of injuries if they subject an employee to the employer’s negligence to which he would not have been subjected if the couplers had not been defective, and that the employer is liable for failure to comply with the act if the failure is a contributing proximate cause of the injuries regardless of how the injuries occur, and whether there was negligence or not. If the case of Lang v. New York Central R. Co., 255 U.S. 455
(41 Sup. Ct. 381, 65 L. ed. 729), is distinguishable, it is because the absence of the draw bar and coupler was not the cause of the employee’s being in a dangerous position between the cars. However, the court in that case seems to have confused negligence and absolute duty in reaching its conclusion and the principle there announced has not been recently followed.
3. The third headnote requires no further discussion.
The court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed. Sutton, C.J., and Worrill, J., concur.