123 S.E.2d 342
39160.Court of Appeals of Georgia.
DECIDED NOVEMBER 16, 1961. REHEARING DENIED DECEMBER 12, 1961.
An award of the Workmen’s Compensation Board will be affirmed where there is any competent evidence to support it.
DECIDED NOVEMBER 16, 1961 — REHEARING DENIED DECEMBER 12, 1961.
Workmen’s compensation. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Tanksley.
This is a change of condition case under Code § 114-709, as amended. The Workmen’s Compensation Board entered an award in favor of the claimant for 25% permanent partial disability as a result of an injury on May 24, 1957. The award was dated January 27, 1958, and was based on a stipulation between the parties. In November, 1959, claimant filed a request for a hearing based on change of condition. After the hearing and filing of medical depositions, the single director made an award in favor of claimant for 100% permanent total disability. The award was affirmed by the full board but, on appeal to the Superior Court of Fulton County, was set aside because the “finding of facts do [sic] not support the award and the award is contrary to law” and the case was remanded to the board
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for “an adequate finding of facts.” After further finding of facts, the board again made an award in claimant’s favor and this award was affirmed on appeal to the superior court. The employer excepts to the adverse judgment.
M. D. McClendon, Bryan, Carter, Ansley Smith, for plaintiff in error.
Rex T. Reeves, Merrell Collier, contra.
EBERHARDT, Judge.
The well-settled rule in Georgia is that an award of the Workmen’s Compensation Board will not be reversed if there is any competent evidence to support it. While the employer attempts to raise issues relative to a pre-existing back injury mentioned in the first award made by the board, there are many cases supporting the proposition that “The original award is conclusive on both the employer and employee as to the extent of the disability of the employee, as found by the [board].” Home Acc. Ins. Co. v. McNair, 173 Ga. 566 (1b) (161 S.E. 131). E.g. Moore v. American Mut. c. Ins. Co., 67 Ga. App. 259
(19 S.E.2d 763); Riegel Textile Corp. v. Vinyard, 88 Ga. App. 753, 755
(77 S.E.2d 760). Therefore, the application of the “any evidence” yardstick is all that is necessary here.
The claimant testified about his condition in January, 1958, the date of the award, as contrasted to his condition in November, 1959, when he had requested a hearing on a change of condition. At the former time, he could “do some work,” although limited in his bending; he drove to California in a pickup truck; he could pick up forty to sixty pounds; he could walk for most of the day; he could sleep through the entire night; he did carpentry work around his house; and, he worked in a service station as a “front man” waiting on trade. At the latter time, he couldn’t do any work; he suffered when driving from his home in Mountain View to Atlanta; he could not carry grocery sacks weighing fifteen to twenty pounds into the house; he could walk for no more than thirty minutes; he got up about three or four times a week in the night; he was “too painful” to do any carpentry work; and, he was no longer able to work at the service station.
This uncontradicted evidence, of itself, would probably be sufficient to meet the “any evidence” test. See General Motors Corp.
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v. Craig, 91 Ga. App. 239, 240 (85 S.E.2d 441); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 90 Ga. App. 595 (83 S.E.2d 576). However, it was substantiated by his service station employer who testified that claimant’s ability to do the “front man” work dwindled to the point where he was unable to perform his duties. Further, an orthopedic surgeon testified that claimant’s physical condition was consistent with his testimony. The physician further stated that, while claimant could do some “light work” on occasion, some days he might not be able to do any work because of the pain. Even the neurological surgeon selected by the employer testified that claimant’s later difficulties could be traced to the original injury.
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the “any evidence” rule has been satisfied here and the superior court did not err in affirming the award of the board.
Judgment affirmed. Carlisle, P. J., and Custer, J., concur.